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 A Legal Fempire?: 
Women in Complex Civil Litigation 
BROOKE D. COLEMAN* 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg made headlines when she said that she would be 
satisfied with the number of women on the Supreme Court “when there are nine.” 
But why should that answer have been so remarkable? After all, there were nine men 
on the Court for nearly all of its history. Yet, Justice Ginsburg’s statement was met 
with amusement—or from some quarters—disdain. What answer would have been 
considered more appropriate coming from a groundbreaking feminist litigator? 
Would four have been an acceptable answer? Would five have been presumptuous? 
This episode reflects our cramped view of how much representation women can 
and should expect in the loftiest reaches of the legal profession. And indeed, while 
women have been attending and graduating from law school in record numbers, they 
are only a fifth of the partners in law firms. Even when they make partner, they are 
paid nearly half the compensation of their male counterparts. Likewise, women are 
underrepresented as state and federal judges, as appellate practitioners, and in com-
plex litigation.  
 This Article begins from the view that gender equity is important to the function-
ing and legitimacy of our legal system, and assesses gender equity—or rather the 
lack thereof—within the legal profession. First, the Article reflects on the gender bias 
task force movement that began almost four decades ago. Second, using a case study 
approach, the Article updates that work by examining the role of women on the 
Judicial Panel for Multidistrict Litigation, as judges, and in multidistrict litigation 
leadership roles. Finally, after assessing the ongoing barriers to gender equity in 
modern complex civil litigation as well as its modest gender-equalizing reforms, the 
Article closes with a set of proposals for how to move toward gender equality. 
 
“The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex 
evidently unfits it for [the practice of law].”1—Justice Joseph Bradley 
 
“I would hope that a wise Latina woman with the richness of her experiences 
would more often than not reach a better conclusion than a white male who hasn’t 
lived that life.”2—Justice Sonia Sotomayor 
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 1. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring). 
 2. Sonia Sotomayor, A Latina Judge’s Voice, 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 87, 92 (2002). 
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INTRODUCTION 
For the first time, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation is chaired by a 
woman and has a majority of female members.3 This is no small feat. During the 
nearly fifty years of the Panel’s existence, fifty judges have served, only seven of 
whom have been women. In fact, the first female panelist was not appointed until as 
recently as 2000.4 Gender equity, as a normative matter, is undoubtedly important. 
Inequity calls the legitimacy of the entire legal system into question.5 Moreover, 
studies repeatedly show that heterogeneity in group decision making leads to better 
results.6 Thus, equity is critical to the efficacy of our legal system. In these respects, 
the current Panel is an encouraging sign of progress.  
Unfortunately, the presence of women in positions of power at the top of the legal 
profession is a novel development. While women are almost half of the students cur-
rently attending law school, they make up only 36% of the legal profession overall.7 
                                                                                                             
 
 3. Current and Former Judges of the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, U.S. 
JUD. PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/Current_ 
Former_Judges_of_the%20Panel-10-9-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5WB-M5T3]. Judge Julie Smith 
Gibbons was appointed in 2000. Id.; see also Panel Judges, U.S. JUD. PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., 
http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/content/panel-judges [https://perma.cc/D2ZA-T69N]. 
 4. Panel Judges, supra note 3. 
 5. See infra Part III.A. 
 6. See infra Part III.A. 
 7. COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, AM. BAR ASS’N, A CURRENT GLANCE AT WOMEN 
IN THE LAW 2 (2016), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/marketing/women/current_ 
glance_statistics_may2016.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5ZB-AXZY]. In 2014–2015, 
49.3% of first-year law students were women. Id. at 4. This is up from 2011 to 2012 when 46.8% 
of first-year law students were women. AM. BAR ASS’N, First Year and Total J.D. Enrollment by 
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On the bench, they hold only one out of every four federal and state court judgeships.8 
Further, while women attend law school and even start law firm jobs at higher rates, 
they occupy only 21% of partnership seats.9 Even when women achieve partnership, 
they earn 44% less than their male counterparts.10 Female lawyers are also pigeon-
holed into lower-income practice areas such as family law instead of practicing in 
high-paying legal sectors.11 Outside of practice and in the academy, women now oc-
cupy roughly 30% of law school professorships, but hold only 31% of head dean-
ships.12  
The racial composition of female legal professionals is also stark. Women of color 
make up roughly 20% of the overall population. Yet, they hold only 8% of state and 
appellate court judgeships.13 More specifically, of the 1344 federal judges appointed 
as of 2016, only 347 have been women.14 Of that 347, only 53 were African Ameri-
can, 29 were Latina, 11 were Asian American, and 1 was American Indian.15 Women 
of color also make up less than 3% of partnership positions at law firms.16 In 2015, 
slightly more than 1% of law partnerships were held by Asian American women, and 
                                                                                                             
 
Gender, 1947–2011, at 1, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_ 
education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/statistics/jd_enrollment_1yr_total_gender.authcheckdam.p
df [https://perma.cc/LK5W-K2W8]. 
 8. See COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, supra note 7, at 5. 
 9. Id. at 2. 
 10. Lizzy McLellan, Male Partners Make 44 Percent More Than Women, Survey Shows, 
LAW.COM (Oct. 20, 2016, 11:21 AM), http://www.law.com/sites/almstaff/2016/10/12/male-
partners-make-44-percent-more-than-women-survey-shows/?slreturn=20170723130302 
[https://perma.cc/FW6Z-LE7N]. 
 11. Hannah C. Dugan, Does Gender Still Matter in the Legal Profession?, ST. B. WIS. 
(Oct. 1, 2002), http://www.wisbar.org/newspublications/wisconsinlawyer/pages/article.aspx? 
Volume=75&Issue=10&ArticleID=248 [https://perma.cc/P49S-T2SN] (“They also tend not 
to practice in substantive law areas that are more lucrative; for example, fewer women practice 
civil litigation, which can bring in substantial contingency fees and thus higher pay. Instead, 
women in higher numbers concentrate on areas of practice such as family law that commonly 
are not as lucrative as other substantive practice areas and that have higher numbers of just 
simply unhappy clients who cannot or will not pay earned fees.”). 
 12. COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, AM. BAR ASS’N, A CURRENT GLANCE AT 
WOMEN IN THE LAW 4, supra note 7; Adriane Kayoko Peralta, The Underrepresentation of 
Women of Color in Law Review Leadership Positions, 25 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 69, 74 
(2015) (as of 2012, “[o]nly 21.5% of full-time faculty members are women, and only 30.4% 
of tenure or tenure-track professors are women”). 
 13. TRACEY E. GEORGE & ALBERT H. YOON, AM. CONST. SOC’Y, THE GAVEL GAP: WHO 
SITS IN JUDGMENT ON STATE COURTS? 7, http://gavelgap.org/pdf/gavel-gap-report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H9ZS-V3Z8]. 
 14. Jonathan K. Stubbs, A Demographic History of Federal Judicial Appointments by Sex 
and Race: 1789–2016, 26 BERK. LA RAZA L.J. 92, 117 (2016) (examining the number of 
judges on federal courts of general jurisdiction). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Renwei Chung, Diversity in the Legal Profession Has Flatlined Since the Great 
Recession; Who Is To Blame?, ABOVE THE LAW (Jan. 6, 2017, 4:31 PM), 
http://abovethelaw.com/2017/01/diversity-in-the-legal-profession-has-flatlined-since-the-
great-recession-who-is-to-blame [https://perma.cc/49MJ-U7U8]. 
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slightly more than half a percent were held by black women and Latina women, re-
spectively.17 In the academic setting, women of color are similarly underrepresented, 
holding only 7% of the tenure and tenure-track positions and 8% of head law school 
deanships.18 As of 2009 there were only 772 women of color serving as law school 
professors.19  
This Article assesses gender equity—or rather the lack thereof—within the legal 
profession. Nearly forty years ago, lawyers, academics, and activists argued for the 
need to increase the number of women in law and to improve their experience within 
the legal system.20 As a major part of that effort, state and federal courts created 
“gender bias task forces” to look at how female lawyers, parties, and court staff 
fared.21 While the granular results of their studies varied, these task forces generally 
found that male lawyers dominated legal practice, women lawyers often suffered 
gross discrimination, and female parties and staff were regularly mistreated on the 
basis of gender.22 Armed with these findings, the task forces laid out a number of 
prescriptions for how to improve the treatment and hiring of women within the legal 
profession. The current statistics demonstrate that the goals of these task forces are 
not yet fully realized.  
Using a case study approach, this Article updates some of the gender bias task 
force work by focusing on women and complex civil litigation. More specifically, it 
will look at the role of women on the Judicial Panel for Multidistrict Litigation, as 
judges, and in multidistrict litigation leadership roles.23 Data in this high-stakes arena 
is necessarily limited because it provides only a snapshot of the larger legal market, 
yet the insights from complex litigation are still of interest. Complex litigation is a 
highly competitive and elite practice area, and one for which exclusivity creates a 
particularly challenging setting for gender equity. Conversely, the extent to which 
gender-equalizing reforms are adopted and working in complex litigation might be 
an indication of the success those reforms could have in other contexts.24 The Article 
will consider developments within complex litigation, reflect on the gender bias task 
                                                                                                             
 
 17. Press Release, NALP, Women, Black/African American-Associates Lose Ground at 
Major U.S. Law Firms 4 tbl.2 (Nov. 19, 2015), http://www.nalp.org/lawfirmdiversity_ 
nov2015#table1 [https://perma.cc/M2Q5-VCUW]. 
 18. Meera E. Deo, Trajectory of a Law Professor, 20 MICH. J. RACE & L. 441, 445–46, 448 (2016). 
 19. Id. at 447. Of those, 53% were African American, 18% were Latina, 14.5% were 
Asian/Pacific Islander, and 2.7% were Native American. Id. The academic picture improves 
slightly if all law school leadership positions are collapsed to include deans and associate 
deans. Then, women of color make up 12% of law school leaders, with white women 
increasing to 35%. Id. at 448. 
 20. Infra Part I.C. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. The Article will focus on the private, not public, sector. See infra note 105. 
 24. It should be acknowledged that there is a risk of only looking at this problem from the 
elite perspective and not also addressing it “from below.” See Kenneth Walter Mack, A Social 
History of Everyday Practice: Sadie T.M. Alexander and the Incorporation of Black Women 
into the American Legal Profession, 1925-1960, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1405, 1410 (2002). As 
an academic, I am an elite, and the risk of analyzing the problem from an elite perspective is 
further compounded by looking at private complex litigation.  
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force efforts, and close with proposals for achieving gender equity both within com-
plex litigation and the broader legal system.  
I. WOMEN IN LAW 
Discussing women as a monolithic group is troublesome. By leaving out an ac-
count of race, class, or sexual orientation, the experience of women who are at the 
intersection of their gender and “other” is lost.25 Some have argued that taking an 
essentialist approach—one that focuses on the common characteristic of female-
ness—is necessary for a concentrated examination of how women are treated un-
fairly.26 Others have argued that leaving intersectionality to the side paints an inac-
curate and misleading picture of women’s individual experiences.27 Add to this the 
sheer lack of information and statistics around the intersection of race and gender, 
for example,28 and the challenge of presenting a complete and rigorous account of 
women in the law is apparent.  
                                                                                                             
 
 25. See Judith Resnik, Gender Bias: From Classes to Courts, 45 STAN. L. REV. 2195, 
2204 (1993) (noting that the gender bias studies are limited in that “much of the available 
demographic information relies on drawing distinctions between women and men, on the one 
hand, and among ‘minorities’ on the other—thus making invisible the woman who is also a 
member of an ethnic or racial minority”); Eli Wald, Glass Ceilings and Dead Ends: 
Professional Ideologies, Gender Stereotypes, and the Future of Women Lawyers at Large Law 
Firms, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2245, 2248 (2010) (noting the “conceptual metaproblem” of 
“collapsing the experiences of women lawyers into one category, ignoring racial, sexual-
orientation, ethnoreligious, socioeconomic, and cultural distinctions” as “highly 
problematic”). 
 26. Vicki C. Jackson, Empiricism, Gender, and Legal Pedagogy: An Experiment in a 
Federal Courts Seminar at Georgetown University Law Center, 83 GEO. L.J. 461, 508–09 
(1994) (“In any piece of work, in order to accomplish anything, we must exclude much. 
Focusing on gender as one source of difference seems to make sense in the world as it now 
exists, and to offer enough possibility for learning some useful things to warrant the risks of 
essentialist misuse.”); Wald, supra note 25, at 2248–49 (noting that the “demands [of] 
unpacking concepts such as ‘women’ lawyers” “might at times cause the discourse to stall by 
rejecting necessary general propositions as overinclusive and too abstract” and that “at some 
level it should not be overlooked or trivialized that [gender stereotypes] affect all women 
lawyers”).   
 27. See, e.g., IDENTITIES, POLITICS, AND RIGHTS (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 
1995); TAMAR PITCH, LIMITED RESPONSIBILITIES: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
189 (John Lea trans., 1995); CAROL SMART, FEMINISM AND THE POWER OF LAW 41–42 (1989); 
Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence 
Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1242–44 (1991) (describing the 
intersectional location of women of color and their marginalization within feminist discourse); 
Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 585 
(1990) (discussing the need for the feminist movement to engage and embrace intersectional 
identities); Judith Resnik, Asking About Gender in Courts, 21 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & 
SOC’Y 952 (1996). 
 28. See, e.g., Carla D. Pratt, Sisters in Law: Black Women Lawyers’ Struggle for 
Advancement, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1777, 1779 (“This Essay calls for more racially 
disaggregated inquiries into the experience of women lawyers in an effort to more accurately 
identify the unique experiences and challenges of women of color, and the degree to which 
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This Article (has and) will often present statistics and discuss women as one—
their commonality will be their gender and only their gender—sometimes because it 
is the only information available and other times because it simplifies the discussion. 
Yet, the Article does so with a full awareness and acknowledgment that doing so 
perpetuates the narrative of feminism as a white, elite movement,29 and it presup-
poses and perpetuates the idea that the norm is white heterosexual elite women and 
the exceptions are women of color, women of different sexual orientations, and 
women of different socioeconomic class. Such narratives and presuppositions are not 
my intention, but it would be foolhardy to fail to acknowledge how my work, in all 
candor, is a part of the problem. In an effort to lessen this potential impact, the Article 
will, whenever possible, endeavor to discuss how women with intersecting charac-
teristics experience the legal profession. It is a modest step, and perhaps not done 
perfectly. Yet, it moves the discussion forward, and in this time of much introspec-
tion about feminism, one hopes such forward motion is a meaningful contribution on 
its own.  
A. The “Firsts”  
Advances for women in the law—and their attendant challenges—have occurred 
over a relatively short period of time. That rather quick ascension has not been easy. 
From joining the profession to going to law school to gaining entry into the highest 
echelons of practice, women have had a fight at every step.  
Women attempted to officially join the profession in the mid-nineteenth century.30 
This effort was made at both the local and national level. It was not until 1869, in 
Iowa, that Arabella Mansfield became the first woman formally licensed to practice 
law in a state.31 On the national front, women were not successful. In 1873, the 
United States Supreme Court held that women did not have a constitutional right to 
practice law under the Fourteenth Amendment.32 Justice Bradley opined that “[t]he 
natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently 
                                                                                                             
 
those experiences vary depending upon the racial background of the woman lawyer.”). 
 29. See DOROTHY SUE COBBLE, LINDA GORDON & ASTRID HENRY, FEMINISM UNFINISHED 
(2014) (providing a history of feminism); ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE & CLASS (1983) 
(describing class and racial divides of first wave feminist and suffrage movements); BELL 
HOOKS, AIN’T I A WOMAN: BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM 145 (1981) (noting that “many 
upper and middle class white feminists who suffer least from sexist oppression were 
attempting to focus all attention on themselves”); Martha Minow, Feminist Reason: Getting It 
and Losing It, 38 J. LEGAL ED. 47 (1988).  
 30. Women, like many men, had practiced as lawyers without being officially licensed.  
Thus, Margaret Brent, from Maryland, is often listed as the first woman lawyer in America. 
See History, N.Y. WOMEN’S B. ASS’N, http://www.nywba.org/history2 [https://perma.cc/ 
X79G-MPXH]. She was not officially licensed to practice law, however. See id.   
 31. Louise B. Raggio, Women Lawyers in Family Law, 33 FAM. L.Q. 501, 505–06 (1999). 
The federal courts were similar. “In 1879, Belva A. Lockwood became the first woman 
admitted to the bar of the U.S. Supreme Court when she persuaded Congress to open the 
federal courts to women lawyers. Later she was first woman to argue a case before the 
Supreme Court.” Id. 
 32. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 139 (1872). 
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unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life.”33 Indeed, according to the Justice, 
women were on Earth “to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and mother,” 
and not to serve as lawyers.34  
Without a constitutional right to practice, women eager to join the profession fol-
lowed Mansfield’s state-based model. Women like Clara Foltz, who joined the 
California State Bar in 1878, worked in their respective states to gain entry into their 
parochial professional bars.35 Charlotte E. Ray, who graduated from Howard 
University School of Law, was admitted to her state bar in 1872, becoming the first 
African American woman lawyer.36 Lyda Burton Conley was the first Native 
American woman admitted to a state bar (Kansas) in 1910, 37 Mary Estella Cota-
Robles was the first Latina woman admitted to a state bar (Arizona) in 1940,38 and 
Sau Ung Loo Chan was the first Asian American woman admitted to a state bar 
(Hawaii) in 1942.39 All of these women utilized their respective state bar systems to 
gain entry into professional practice. 
These trailblazing women became the “firsts” in their states, but it is not as if once 
admitted to the practice of law all other barriers dissolved. Women in law during this 
time confronted consistent attacks on their competency and their gender. Clara Foltz 
famously cut off challenges to her analytical abilities by stating, “I ask no special 
privileges and expect no favors, but I think it only fair that those who have had better 
opportunities than I . . . should meet me on even ground, upon the merits of law and 
fact without this everlasting and incessant reference to sex . . . .”40  
Admission into law schools was no different. Lemma Barkaloo and Pheobe 
Wilson Couzins were the first women admitted to law school, attending Washington 
University in St. Louis in 1869.41 Other law schools soon followed and admitted 
women into their programs—schools such as Howard University (admitting 
Charlotte E. Ray, who graduated in 1872), the University of Michigan and Boston 
                                                                                                             
 
 33. Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).   
 34. Id. 
 35. See Barbara Allen Babcock, Feminist Lawyers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1689, 1693 (1998) 
(reviewing VIRGINIA DRACHMAN, SISTERS IN LAW: WOMEN LAWYERS IN MODERN AMERICAN 
HISTORY (1998)). 
 36. Pratt, supra note 28, at 1780. Lucy Terry Prince is thought to be the first black woman 
to appear before the Supreme Court when she acted as a lay advocate in 1795. Id. n.13; see 
also History, supra note 30 (noting that Charlotte E. Ray was the first black woman admitted 
to a state bar in the District of Columbia).   
 37. History, supra note 30.  
 38. Arizona Trailblazers: Women and Minority Trailblazers, STATE BAR OF ARIZ., 
http://www.azbar.org/aboutus/mission-vision-andcorevalues/diversity/arizonatrailblazers/ 
[https://perma.cc/8D9F-N87S]. 
 39. History, supra note 30; see also Curtis Lum, Sau Ung Loo Chan, 95, Broke Legal 
Ground, HONOLULUADVERTISER.COM (Mar. 10, 2002), http://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/ 
article/2002/Mar/10/ln/ln26a.html [https://perma.cc/A5Q6-QXLW]. 
 40. Clara Shortridge Foltz, Struggles and Triumphs of a Woman Lawyer, NEW AM. 
WOMAN, Jan. 1918, at 4, 15. 
 41. History, supra note 30. Couzins graduated in 1871 and Barbaloo, while gaining 
admission into the Missouri bar, did not complete law school. Id. 
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University in 1872, Hastings Law School in 1878 (after losing a lawsuit about ad-
mitting women), and Buffalo Law School in 1887.42 Other law schools waited a few 
more decades. Fordham Law School and Yale Law School first admitted women in 
1918,43 while other elite schools like Columbia and Harvard waited until 1919 and 
1950, respectively.44  
In law school, the doors may have opened, but women did not receive a full-
throated welcome. For example, in 1955, Ruth Bader Ginsburg was famously asked 
by then Harvard Law Dean Erwin Griswold how she could justify taking a coveted 
position at the law school from a qualified man.45 Admission to the schools did not 
translate into male colleagues’ or professors’ acceptance of women as equals.  
Once in law school and admitted into law practice, the next goals became status 
within the legal profession. Starting in 1934, women began to ascend into more pres-
tigious jobs like federal judgeships. That year, President Roosevelt appointed 
Florence Ellinwood Allen to the U.S. Court of Appeals.46 While the appointment was 
significant, it is worth noting that during the 145 years and through the thirty-one 
presidents before Allen’s appointment, not one woman was appointed to a judgeship 
on a federal court.47  
Moreover, even when Presidents after President Roosevelt appointed women, 
they did so at low rates. Men, and specifically white men, still dominated the picture. 
Federal judicial appointments by Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford, for 
example, each exceeded 98% men, with the appointments of white men ranging from 
89% to 96%.48 It was not until President Carter that this trend changed. In his admin-
istration, approximately 15% of his appointments were women.49 (Carter was the 
first president to appoint more than three women to the federal bench.)50 Yet, 
                                                                                                             
 
 42. Id.  
 43. Id. One woman, Alice Rufie Jordan Blake, graduated from Yale Law School in 1886, 
but her story was a bit unusual, and she was the only woman to graduate from the law school 
until another woman graduated in 1920. Judith Schiff, Yale’s First Female Graduate, YALE 
ALUMNI MAG. (Sept./Oct. 2013), https://yalealumnimagazine.com/articles/3742/yales-first-
female-graduate [https://perma.cc/9B3A-2N2D]. 
 44. History, supra note 30. 
 45. LINDA HIRSHMAN, SISTERS IN LAW 15–16 (2015). 
 46. Mary L. Clark, One Man's Token Is Another Woman's Breakthrough? The 
Appointment of the First Women Federal Judges, 49 VILL. L. REV. 487, 487 (2004); Lynn 
Hecht Schafran, Not from Central Casting: The Amazing Rise of Women in the American 
Judiciary, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 953, 964 n.56 (2005). While Judge Allen was the first woman 
to be appointed to a federal court position with lifetime tenure, she was not the first judge 
appointed to a federal court of general jurisdiction.  Stubbs, supra note 14, at 101.  Genevieve 
Rose Cline was appointed with lifetime tenure to the U.S. Customs Court by President 
Coolidge. Id. 
 47. Stubbs, supra note 14, at 99. As noted above, some women had been appointed to 
specialty federal courts, but not one woman had been appointed to a federal court of general 
jurisdiction until 1934.   
 48. See id. at 103–06. 
 49. Id. at 106.  
 50. Id.  
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President Reagan returned to prior patterns, making only 8% of his judicial appoint-
ments to women.51 With respect to women of color, between 1789 and 1976, only 
one woman of color was appointed to the federal bench: Judge Constance Baker 
Motley was appointed by President Johnson in 1966.52 President Carter appointed 
seven African American women and one Latina, but President Reagan similarly took 
a few steps backward by appointing only one African American woman and one 
Latina during his two terms.53 
In addition to federal judicial appointments, another professional battleground has 
been law firm partnership. As women attended law school and began entering the 
profession in larger numbers, some started to break into the partnership ranks at ma-
jor law firms. For example, in Seattle in the 1950s, Preston Gates (now K&L Gates) 
was allegedly the first firm in the Northwest to elevate a woman to partner.54 That 
firm also claims that it was the first firm to include a woman’s name in its partnership 
title when Betty Fletcher joined its partner ranks.55 Vinson & Elkins, a major inter-
national law firm, made its first woman partner in 1979 when it elevated Carol E. 
Dinkins.56  
In sum, between the late nineteenth and mid-twentieth century, women began to 
make headway into what had previously been a completely white, male-dominated 
profession. That headway, while meaningful, had something of a two steps forward, 
one step back effect, leading to an important call for new thinking on how to achieve 
gender equity.  
B. Gender Bias Task Force Studies 
Despite meaningful progress, as late as the 1980s, women were still not accepted 
members of the legal profession. Their numbers may have grown, but as women 
became more prominent in the field, they could recognize their progress and also see 
quite starkly the shortcomings of how gender and the law intersected for them. In 
response to these challenges, women began to organize into different groups to bring 
more attention to these infirmities.  
One well-known movement started with a collaboration between the National 
Organization for Women and the National Association of Women Judges.57 Their 
goal was to educate judges about gender discrimination in their courtrooms. The 
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movement became known colloquially as “Gender Bias Task Forces.”58 These task 
forces attempted to shed light not just on the profession, but on all aspects of how 
women were treated within the legal system, including, but not limited to, domestic 
violence, divorce, and parental custody.59  
State courts were pathbreaking in their creation of gender bias task forces. New 
Jersey was the first state to assemble a task force in 1982.60 Other states followed 
that lead, with some thirty states adopting them by 1990.61 Federal courts were no-
ticeably reluctant to follow the states for some time.62 It was not until 1990 that the 
D.C. Circuit became the first federal circuit to establish a task force on “gender, race, 
and ethnic bias.”63 The Ninth Circuit followed and circulated its draft of preliminary 
results in 1992.64 In all, eight federal circuit courts eventually adopted gender bias 
task forces, leaving four of their sister circuits behind.65 
Each of the state and federal courts approached their work differently.66 For ex-
ample, the Ninth Circuit task force on gender bias “decided not to impose a definition 
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of ‘gender bias’ in the federal system nor to look for bias per se.”67 Instead, it 
searched for what it called the “effects of gender.”68 New Jersey took a more direct 
approach with its gender study than the Ninth Circuit, reaching out to “investigate 
the extent to which gender bias exists.”69 Almost all of the task forces left out inquir-
ies—or only inquired briefly—into how race and gender might intersect.70 
While the task forces took different approaches, their inquiries and findings over-
lapped quite a bit. For example, most examined how female litigants and defendants 
were treated. Through a mix of data and narrative, the studies found many discrep-
ancies in how female parties were treated. Courts regularly trivialized domestic vio-
lence cases, awarded lower attorneys’ fees to economically dependent spouses in 
divorce proceedings, and held women in child custody cases to a higher, gender-
stereotyped standard of behavior.71 Similarly, many of the studies assessed how fe-
male court personnel were treated. There again, the treatment was found wanting.72 
The findings about court parties and personnel are undoubtedly of great interest, 
but are beyond the scope of this Article. The narrow focus is instead on female legal 
professionals and how they experienced the courts. There were over forty studies, 
which makes a comprehensive review of the task force reports infeasible. Instead, I 
have selected a cross-section of state and federal reports representing seven states 
and two federal circuits.73 In spite of the different approaches and scope of these 
studies, they all intersected at two pertinent findings: (1) the underrepresentation of 
women in professional legal positions and (2) rampant sexism. 
1. Women as Lawyers and Judges: The Numbers 
Women as a percentage of lawyers and judges was (and still is) well below the 
relative number of women in the general population. This was true in each of the task 
force reports. The real question for the task forces was just how far below the general 
population—and in many cases just how far below the national averages—each 
would be.  
In the Eighth Circuit, in 1997, women were only 12–19% of the attorneys prac-
ticing in federal courts.74 The national percentage at that time was approximately 
23%.75 Judges fared no better with women holding only 13% of the federal judge-
ships in the circuit relative to almost 18% of federal judgeships being held by women 
nationwide.76 To put it in even more stark numbers, of the 149 total judges on the 
bench in the Eighth Circuit in 1997, only one woman served on the court of appeals, 
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seven in the federal district court, four in the bankruptcy courts, and seven as magis-
trate judges.77 Similarly, in the Ninth Circuit, the task force found that women were 
grossly underrepresented in the courtroom and on the bench: Only 16% of the law-
yers in federal practice and 12% percent of federal judicial positions in the Ninth 
Circuit were women.78 
State courts fared no better. In 1993 in Missouri, women made up only 8% of the 
state judiciary, while nationwide women filled between 10% and 15% of the elected 
and appointed judgeships.79 Women were only 23% of the lawyers, but 43% of law 
students and 53% of the general population nationwide.80 Other states like Utah 
found that of its 90 judges of record, only 7% were women.81  
Across the board, the gender bias task force studies found that women were not 
practicing law or serving as judges in numbers commensurate with the general pop-
ulation. In spite of the progress that had been made by the “firsts,” there was still 
quite a way to go toward true equity.  
2. Sexist Treatment of Women  
Of the women who had made it into the profession, the next question for many of 
the task force studies was how were those women treated? The answer was not en-
couraging. All of the task force work consistently found that male colleagues and 
judges behaved boorishly in interactions with female attorneys. Even the task forces 
themselves were the subject of sexist skepticism and rebuff.82 When the New Jersey 
task force sent out its attorney survey, it immediately discovered the challenges 
ahead. Scrawled on the surveys were comments such as “[w]hat is [gender bias], a 
disease?,” “[w]hy are you wasting the taxpayers’ money,” and “[d]on’t you girls have 
anything better to do with your time?”83 
This response to the task force work mirrored realities in courtrooms, chambers, 
and law offices across the country. In the Report of the New York Task Force on 
Women in the Courts, the then-Attorney General stated that “[m]ale attorneys do not 
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have their gender or their lives brought gratuitously into the courtroom” the way that 
female attorneys do.84 This difference manifested in female attorneys regularly being 
referred to as “dear” or “young lady.”85 Blatant and humiliating sexual remarks were 
the norm. In one case, a judge threatened a female attorney that he would “put [her] 
over [his] knee and spank [her]” because she strongly disagreed with him.86  
In the Eighth Circuit, sixty percent of female attorneys reported some form of 
“gender-based incivility,” including unprofessional forms of address, offensive com-
ments about appearance, off-color jokes and comments, and being mistaken for a 
non-lawyer.87 Similarly, the Washington State Task Force on Gender and Justice in 
the Courts determined that male attorneys demeaned female lawyers by making 
openly sexist remarks by using first names or patronizing terms like “dear,” “young 
lady,” or “girls,” and by making gratuitous remarks about personal appearance.88 In 
New York, female lawyers also reported being snubbed or ignored by male judges 
and attorneys.89 
Overall, the findings were discouraging. Women were treated quite differently on 
the basis of their gender, and that treatment was often offensive and intimidating. 
The task forces could not help but note that there must be a relation between these 
attitudes and behaviors and the relatively low numbers of women serving as lawyers 
and judges.  
C. Gender Bias Task Force Recommendations 
Once the various task forces had all their data, most compiled a list of recommen-
dations for improvement. To address the way women were treated, state court task 
forces like those in New York suggested judicial education programs on bias and 
changes to the rules of professional conduct that would address gender-biased be-
havior.90 The Eighth Circuit Task Force also recommended educational efforts fo-
cused on “gender and civility issues,” including a focus on law school curriculum 
and bar education.91 Other federal circuit court studies suggested action ranging from 
education and training, to the adoption of local court rules, to the establishment of 
circuit-level committees dedicated to continuing study and attention to gender bias.92  
To address the inequitable representation of women as lawyers and on the bench, 
task forces also made recommendations focused on active recruitment. With respect 
                                                                                                             
 
 84. Report of the New York Task Force on Women in the Courts, 15 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
11, 128 (1986).   
 85. Id. at 130. 
 86. Id. at 133. 
 87. Eighth Circuit Gender Fairness Task Force, supra note 65, at 132–35.   
 88. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE WASHINGTON STATE TASK FORCE ON GENDER AND 
JUSTICE IN THE COURTS FINAL REPORT 24 (1989), http://www.courts.wa.gov/committee/pdf/ 
Gender%20and%20Justice%20in%20the%20Courts--Final%20Report%201989.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/4C7C-UGKV]. 
 89. See Report of the New York Task Force on Women in the Courts, supra note 84, at 141–42. 
 90. See id. at 162–65.   
 91. Eighth Circuit Gender Fairness Task Force, supra note 65, at 169.   
 92. See Schafran, supra note 65, at 636–37. 
630 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 93:617 
 
to court committee and advisory groups (really a stepping stone to judicial appoint-
ments), the Eighth Circuit Task Force recommended encouraging more women to 
apply for the positions and, relatedly, for more women to be appointed to those 
groups.93 The structural changes required to increase applications and appointments 
were not elaborated upon.  
Similarly, the Missouri task force focused on the low numbers of female judges 
and found that many of the lawyers surveyed believed that gender bias prevented 
judges from being elected and a lack of formal or consistent criteria for evaluating 
judicial candidates contributed to an unfair selection process by court commission-
ers.94 In response, the task force recommended reforming both the election and ap-
pointment processes by providing better training to court commissioners, creating 
ethical rules (encouraging greater transparency) to govern nominating commissioner 
processes, standardizing the appointment process, and exploring ways to increase 
outreach and recruitment efforts to female prospects.95 
Utah’s task force made similar, albeit less ambitious, recommendations. It found 
that nominating commissioners often asked inappropriate questions regarding the 
candidates’ willingness to travel and their emotional state.96 To respond to this issue, 
the task force recommended education programs for the commission members.97 It 
also recommended that sitting judges and court administration “encourage qualified 
women to apply.”98 
Missing from most of the gender bias task force studies was a consideration of 
intersecting factors for many women—race, class, and sexual orientation, for exam-
ple. Some of the studies self-consciously chose to forego a consideration of those 
factors to focus solely on gender.99 Other task forces did not appear to be quite as 
self-aware. Indeed, the creators of the task force movement advocated for an essen-
tialist approach to the studies.100 In the gender bias task force “manual,” members 
were encouraged to “deal with gender bias only” or risk “overload and confusion” if 
trying to study other issues.101 The price of not considering race and other intersect-
ing identities is that it leaves little administrative data or thought about how these 
intersecting factors affected women in the practice of law during the time of these 
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studies. This—as many commentators noted—made many women invisible in this 
process.  
Overall, however, the task force efforts encouraged increased education and gov-
ernance efforts, at least with respect to gender broadly. Many task forces also recom-
mended creating enduring committees to continue study and efforts in the context of 
gender equity. The gender bias task force movement arguably led to a heightened 
consciousness of gender issues in the legal realm and some concomitant changes in 
favor of gender equity. The question is how effective that effort has been.  
II. MODERN COMPLEX LITIGATION & WOMEN  
Women began attending law school in larger numbers nearly forty years ago.102 
In 1985, the percentage of female first-year law students first crossed the forty per-
cent mark.103 By 1996, it crossed fifty percent and has hovered around that number 
ever since.104 Around that time, most of the concentrated gender bias task force work 
had also come to an end. Over twenty years later, what do we have to show for the 
fact that more women are attending law school than ever before? This Part will begin 
to answer that question by focusing on women as lawyers and judges in modern 
complex litigation, and more specifically in multidistrict litigation.105  
A. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation  
The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) is an elite panel of judges 
who consolidate related cases so that pretrial issues can be uniformly resolved.106 
The JPML consists of seven federal circuit and district court judges who are ap-
pointed to the panel by the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court.107 The 
Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) statute that created the consolidation device and the 
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JPML was adopted only two years after the modern class action rule (Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 23) was created.108 While multidistrict litigation had a 
slow start as a procedural device—especially when compared to class actions under 
FRCP 23 during the first few decades following its adoption—multidistrict litigation 
is now universally considered the locus of some of the most important cases both 
monetarily and structurally.109 In other words, multidistrict litigation is the new 
black, with more than a third of pending federal cases consolidated into MDLs.110 
Thus, an appointment to the JPML and the attendant power to make decisions about 
consolidation is a strong sign that one is near the top of her judicial profession.111 
The first JPML was constituted in 1968; it was not surprisingly made up of seven 
white male judges.112 It remained an all-male panel until 2000 when Judge Julie 
Smith Gibbons became the first woman appointed to the panel.113 Four years later in 
2004, a second woman, Judge Kathryn H. Vratil, was appointed.114 The slow pace of 
progress picked up in 2010, starting with the appointment of Judge Barbara S. 
Jones.115 Her appointment ushered in the appointment of four additional female 
judges between then and 2014: Judges Marjorie O. Rendell, Sarah S. Vance, Ellen 
Segal Huvelle, and Catherine D. Perry.116  
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In the fifty years that the Panel has been in existence, fifty judges have served, 
and only seven of those have been women.117 These women are white.118 The lack of 
racial diversity and the paucity of women on the JPML is quite discouraging. Yet, 
for the first time, the Panel is chaired by a woman, Judge Sarah Vance, and for the 
first time, the Panel is majority women with four female judges and three male 
judges.119  
The JPML is necessarily made of up sitting federal judges, so an inevitable 
question is from whom does the Chief Justice choose his appointments? As dis-
cussed earlier, Presidents appoint judges to the federal bench, and if there are not 
as many women to choose from, this is at least one aspect of why the JPML simi-
larly underrepresents women. Women make up only 26% of the federal judiciary, 
and this underrepresentation can be traced to the presidential appointments to the 
federal judiciary.120 As also discussed earlier, it was not until President Roosevelt 
that a woman was first appointed to the federal bench and not until President Carter 
that women were asked to serve as federal judges in moderately significant num-
bers.121 
Thus, the lack of women on the federal bench has deep structural roots that have 
only recently begun to change by modern Presidents making a concerted effort to 
appoint more women. Even then, however, the progress seems glacial. President 
George H.W. Bush’s federal appointments were almost 20% women.122 President 
Bill Clinton was the first President to exceed 20% by making almost 28% of his 
federal judicial appointments to women.123 President George W. Bush did not meet 
Clinton’s numbers, but he still made 22% of his federal judicial appointments to 
women.124 President Barack Obama’s imprint appears to be the strongest by mak-
ing 42% of his federal judicial appointments to women.125 In his first five years of 
office, President Obama appointed more women than Presidents Reagan, H.W. 
Bush, and W. Bush combined.126 This progress has completely stalled under now-
                                                                                                             
 
 117. Id. 
 118. Julia Smith Gibbons, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Julia_Smith_Gibbons 
[https://perma.cc/ZQG9-9Z4E]; Ellen Segal Huvelle, ALCHETRON, https://alchetron.com/Ellen-Segal-
Huvelle [https://perma.cc/ZCQ3-DHSS]; Barbara S. Jones, BRACEWELL, https://bracewell.com/ 
people/barbara-s-jones [https://perma.cc/E3HM-53KG]; Jennifer J. Salopek, Judge Catherine D. 
Perry, AM. INNS OF CT. (Sept./Oct. 2016), https://home.innsofcourt.org/AIC/Awards_and_ 
Scholarships/Professionalism_Awards/Professionalism_Awards_Recipients/2016_Judge_Catherine
_D._Perry.aspx [https://perma.cc/MFA4-MA46?type=image]; Judge Marjorie O. Rendell, DUANE 
MORRIS, https://www.duanemorris.com/site/alumni_profiles_rendell.html [https://perma.cc/W63P-
MH7S]; The Hon. Sarah S. Vance, AM. L. INST., https://www.ali.org/members/member/100864/ 
[https://perma.cc/GST8-ZASR]; Kathryn Vratil, JD, U. KAN., https://emilytaylorcenter.ku.edu/ 
womens-hall-of-fame/vratil-kathryn [https://perma.cc/6V35-JQ3R]. 
 119. Panel Judges, supra note 3. 
 120. Stubbs, supra note 14, at 117. 
 121. See supra Part I.A. 
 122. See Stubbs, supra note 14, at 107.   
 123. Id. at 108. President Clinton appointed the first Asian American woman to the bench, 
Susan Oki Mollway. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 109. 
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President Donald J. Trump. As of November 2017, only 19% of Trump’s nomina-
tions for the federal judiciary are women.127 Only 9% of his nominees are 
nonwhite.128 These numbers parallel the appointments he is making to other elite 
positions such as his Cabinet and the offices of the U.S. Attorney.129 
The implication of federal judicial appointments is that they create the pool of 
available candidates for positions of power like JPML. Perhaps that is why more 
female judges have been recently appointed to the Panel. However, the Chief Justice 
still has full discretion in making those appointments, regardless of the available 
pool. Moreover, if the trend of appointing more women to the federal bench begins 
to wane—as is already the case under the current administration—it is not clear what 
impact that will have on future appointments to this panel.  
Finally, not one woman of color has been appointed to the JPML to date.130 Again, 
this can be traced, in part, to the available pool: of the 347 women currently sitting 
as federal judges, only 94 (or 27%) are women of color.131 While President Obama 
made significantly more appointments of women of color to the federal bench, it may 
take a while for those appointments to become part of the pool the Chief Justice 
considers. Yet, as will be discussed in Part III.B, given the benefit of heterogeneity 
in group decision making and the benefit to systemic legitimacy, it is something he 
should consider straight away.132  
                                                                                                             
 
 127. Trump’s Federal Judge Picks Lack Diversity So Far, With Many Vacancies to Fill, 
TIMES-PICAYUNE, (Nov. 14, 2017), http://www.nola.com/national_politics/2017/11/ 
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 128. Id. 
 129. His Cabinet is overwhelmingly white and male. Jasmine C. Lee, Trump’s Cabinet So 
Far Is More White and Male than Any First Cabinet Since Reagan’s, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 
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Attorney are no different. Of the forty-two people he has nominated for U.S. Attorney, only 
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is a Woman, CNN POLITICS, (Sept. 12, 2017, 4:24 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/12/ 
politics/us-attorneys-one-women/index.html [https://perma.cc/YRF4-L282].  
 130.  See supra note 118. 
 131. See Stubbs, supra note 14, at 117.   
 132. It does not appear that there is any work on the demographic makeup of transferee 
judges. It is not hard to imagine, however, that—like the JPML—transferee judges are 
similarly reflective of the federal judiciary as a whole.  Anecdotally at least, the demographic 
makeup may be even more skewed toward white men.  The most notable recent MDL cases—
VW, Vioxx, and Toyota, for example—were all adjudicated by white male judges. See In re 
Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig., 148 F. Supp. 3d 
1367, 1369 (J.P.M.L. 2015) (Judge Charles R. Breyer); In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended 
Acceleration Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig., 704 F. Supp. 2d 1379, 1382 
(J.P.M.L. 2010) (Judge James V. Selna); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 360 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 
1354 (J.P.M.L. 2005) (Judge Eldon E. Fallon). 
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B. Transferee Judges 
Once the JPML decides to consolidate a case, it must then decide to which district 
court judge the case should be transferred. Like the JPML, the transferee judge has a 
meaningful impact on the trajectory of the litigation. The judge generally appoints 
the legal leadership teams, resolves pretrial disputes, and exercises a great deal of 
influence over the potential for settlement. Being appointed as a transferee judge is 
largely viewed as a considerable achievement in the life of an Article III district court 
judge. 
Unsurprisingly, the current gender composition of transferee judges is reflective 
of other elite areas of the legal profession. As of July 2016, 33% of active U.S. district 
court judges were women.133 Thus, one might expect that—given that pool—a simi-
lar percentage of female judges would be appointed to transferee judge positions. 
That expectation would be wrong. As of April 2017, there were 236 active MDL 
dockets being handled by 186 transferee judges.134 Of those 186 judges, 46—or 
25%—were women.135 In other words, an already underrepresentative number of 
district court judges is compounded further once there is a decidedly sought after and 
elite position like an MDL transferee judge on the line.  
C. MDL Litigation  
Related to the composition of the judges deciding which cases are consolidated 
into multidistrict litigation and which judges adjudicate those cases is the composi-
tion of the lawyers who litigate, and more important, lead those cases. Once the 
JPML decides to consolidate and transfer a case, the transferee judge—the judge 
presiding over the entire lot of consolidated cases—has a great deal of authority and 
power. That power, in many cases, includes appointing the team of plaintiffs’ law-
yers who will lead the litigation.136 These leadership positions are plum ones because 
with such a position comes the power to make strategic decisions about how the case 
will proceed.137 Moreover, the lawyers leading the MDL litigation are likely to ne-
gotiate any potential settlement and related attorneys’ fees.138  
The competition for these leadership positions is fierce, and again not surpris-
ingly, most of the time the appointed lawyers are white men. A recent study found 
                                                                                                             
 
 133. NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., JUDGES AND THE COURTS: WOMEN IN THE FEDERAL 
JUDICIARY: STILL A LONG WAY TO GO 1 (2016), https://nwlc.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2016/07/JudgesCourtsWomeninFedJud7.14.16.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3L7-85TT]. 
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 135. See id. 
 136. See Dodge, supra note 109, at 355–56. 
 137. See Julie A. Steinberg, More Women Plaintiffs’ Lawyers Becoming Complex 
Litigation Leaders, BNA (Feb. 3, 2107), https://www.bna.com/women-plaintiffs-lawyers-
n57982083338/ [https://perma.cc/KR2P-VF9N ] (citing an unpublished study by Dana Alvare 
at the Sheller Center for Social Justice at the Temple University School of Law). 
 138. See Burch, supra note 111, at 81. 
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that between 2011 and 2015, women made up only 16% of all plaintiffs’ MDL lead-
ership appointments.139 The somewhat positive news is that the number of women in 
MDL leadership has steadily increased during this time.140 Women held only 13.5% 
of leadership roles in 2011, but with the exception of 2013, that percentage has stead-
ily grown each year.141 The study found that in 2015 women held over 27% of the 
MDL leadership positions.142 
The news is not all rosy, however. Within MDL leadership, there is further strat-
ification. There are the “Tier 1” leaders—those lawyers who essentially function as 
lead counsel—and “Tier 2” leaders—those who serve lower-level leadership func-
tions.143 According to the same study of MDL cases between 2011 and 2015, women 
held only 15% of Tier 1 leadership roles and 19% of Tier 2 leadership roles.144 In 
addition, almost 50% of cases did not have any women in Tier 1 leadership roles, 
while 98% of cases had at least one male attorney at that level.145 Worse still, 63% 
of cases did not have any women in leadership positions at either tier level.146 
Other studies echo these results. In one study, Elizabeth Burch examined the phe-
nomenon of repeat-player law firms and individuals in multidistrict litigation.147 
Burch collected data from seventy-two product liability and sales-practices multidis-
trict litigation cases pending as of May 2013.148 She found that certain “repeat play-
ers” were regularly appointed to leadership positions in the litigation. More specifi-
cally, 30% of the available leadership roles were occupied by an elite group of fifty 
attorneys.149 Those elite lawyers were named lead attorney in five or more multidis-
trict litigation cases then pending.150 Of those premier fifty attorneys, only eleven—
or 22%—were women.151 
                                                                                                             
 
 139. Steinberg, supra note 137. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id.  
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 151. Id. at 93 n.102. A less formal study by Jaime Dodge made similar findings. For cases 
pending as of April 2014, Dodge found that between 2000 and 2004, men were appointed to 
plaintiff’s side leadership positions 11.8 times more often than women. Dodge, supra note 
109, at 364. Between 2005 and 2009, men were appointed 6.73 times more often, and between 
2010 and 2014, 3.02 times more often. Id. When looking specifically at “Tier 1” leadership 
roles on the plaintiff’s side, Dodge found that between 2005 and 2009, men were appointed 7 
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At least one study has shown that MDL defense-side lawyers are slightly more 
diverse. In most cases the defendant, not the transferee judge, appoints its lawyers in 
multidistrict litigation.152 One study found that slightly more women represented de-
fendants in this context. Between 2010 and 2014, the study found that men were 
appointed as defense counsel 2.88 times more than women.153 In contrast, during the 
same time period, men were appointed as plaintiffs’ attorneys 3.02 times more than 
women.154 It is difficult to know why there is this slight difference, and of course, 
there are limitations to the study.155 Nonetheless, the findings suggest that there is a 
variance, which begs the question of whether and how structural differences in the 
appointment processes for plaintiff and defense lawyers contribute to that difference. 
Finally, with respect to women of color, little if any empirical work has been done 
to assess the number of women of color appointed to leadership positions within 
MDL cases. Anecdotally at least, the sense is that those numbers are even lower than 
the number of women as a whole.156 Like JPML judges, women of color are un-
derrepresented as MDL lawyers. 
In sum, the elite practice of multidistrict litigation—from the judges to the attor-
neys—is slowly changing to include more white women, but it is failing to include 
women of color. There may be lessons from women’s experiences in complex litiga-
tion, but there is certainly more work to be done. 
III. MOVING GENDER EQUALITY FORWARD 
In this Section, the Article will make the case for why the inclusion of all women 
in complex litigation—and law more broadly—is important. Having made that case, 
it will focus on what we have learned from women’s experience in complex litiga-
tion. Finally, it will make a variety of proposals for how to ensure that all women 
have a chance to succeed in law.  
A. The Case for Gender Equity 
What might seem obvious is not always so. Such is the case with the argument 
that diversity within institutions is essential. In this Section, the Article argues that 
women should be participating in the practice of law—at all levels—in numbers that 
are reflective of the general population. This argument is not made for the sake of 
aesthetic appeal, but because there is value in ensuring that women participate and 
lead at higher numbers than are currently reflected in the statistics. First, heteroge-
neity mitigates the risks inherent in group decision making. Second and related, when 
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women are part of a decision-making process, the results are different, often—it ap-
pears—in a way that is beneficial. Third, diversity lends the civil justice system 
greater credibility and legitimacy. And finally, with respect to the most elite echelons 
of the legal market, there is a duty to commit to greater heterogeneity because of a 
consistent and blatant history of exclusion. 
First, group decision making of all kinds—including judicial and lawyerly deci-
sion making—is most optimal when the group is heterogeneous. Group decision 
making has been studied at length by numerous social scientists.157 It is beyond the 
scope and capacity of this Article to restate that work in detail. Yet, there is one 
important generalization that can be made from this literature that is both significant 
and supportive of greater diversity: group decisions are better when made by a group 
that includes a variety of viewpoints.158 Stated differently, there are meaningful risks 
in homogenous group decision making. Risks like cascade effect159 and confirmation 
bias160 are ready examples. Those risks can be most profitably mitigated by creating 
a more heterogeneous group.  
Some scholars argue that instead of using identity, “cognitive diversity” should 
be employed.161 Cognitive diversity has appeal because instead of focusing on “vis-
ible differences such as race, ethnicity, age, gender, physical disabilities, and demo-
graphic dissimilarities,” cognitive diversity focuses on identity as well as “diverse 
knowledge and expertise stemming from training, experiences, [and] expertise.”162 
                                                                                                             
 
 157. See IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS 
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diversity).   
 162. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation, 70 VAND. L. REV. 
67, 140 (2017). 
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Cognitive diversity appeals to the notion that society should not “reward” individuals 
with opportunity simply because of their identity—something with which they were 
born. It must instead focus on qualifications that are earned through experience, ed-
ucation, and for lack of a better term, grit. In short, the allure of an argument like 
cognitive diversity is that it minimizes—and in some instances, eliminates—identity.  
While there is certainly worth to cognitive diversity, it should not replace or 
eclipse identity diversity as an equality value. First, cognitive diversity underesti-
mates, or in the very least obscures, the impact identity has on one’s cognitive devel-
opment. For example, one scholar arguing in favor of cognitive diversity provides 
the following hypothetical: “[A] Mexican American woman raised in an upper class 
family who attends Harvard Law School may have similar analytical tools and train-
ing as white males attending the same school.”163 It seems plausible that two individ-
uals with similar socioeconomic status and the same elite law school training might 
have some cognitive and analytical tools in common. However, those commonali-
ties—assuming they exist—cannot displace the distinct and profound experiential 
differences a Latina and a non-Latino white man have because of their identity.  
Cognitive diversity proponents would respond that they believe identity matters; 
indeed, the intersection of surface and internal forms of diversity is an area of study 
in which social scientists are engaged.164 What they—cognitive diversity propo-
nents—want is a more nuanced approach to assessing diversity. The risk of not doing 
so, they argue, is twofold. First, the context and complexity of interactions and deci-
sion making are lost when the only point of study is identity.165 And second, there is 
a risk that by observing only identity, one might assume that identity alone dictates 
“cognitive styles, values, or beliefs.”166 These are certainly valid risks.  
Yet, there is a greater risk. The problem with talking about cognitive diversity as 
a replacement or proxy for identity diversity is that it provides cover for the fact that 
identity diversity does not yet exist.167 In fact, as this Article shows within the context 
of complex litigation, we are not even close to obtaining identity equality. While 
cognitive diversity might have a place in this important discussion, it must take a 
back seat to identity diversity—at least for now. In other words, until power is 
equally distributed in a way that reflects the various identities in our society, the 
luxury of parsing the impact of diversity in our cognition must wait.  
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Second, and relatedly, cognitive diversity—unlike identity diversity—is difficult 
to measure. As discussed, there are studies attempting to measure the impact of cog-
nitive diversity on group decision making, but getting at internal distinctions between 
individuals proves to be challenging.168 In contrast, identity is relatively easier to 
measure and can be observed both within and without scientific study. 
Thus, while identity is not the only way to achieve heterogeneity, it is certainly a 
decent place to start. Scholars have identified these issues already in the context of 
multidistrict litigation. Conformity and the lack of dissent among the repeat players 
who often lead the plaintiffs’ MDL case can lead to suboptimal results for their cli-
ents.169 When group members are encouraged and allowed to express differing view-
points, better decisions are made.170 The lack of that diversity, as is often the case in 
MDL leadership committees, means that there are many risks: lead lawyers might 
use their elevated position to bargain for increased fees at the expense of the overall 
settlement value;171 fears about reputation and future opportunities prevent some 
leading lawyers from objecting on the basis of misgivings about a case or proposed 
settlement,172 and transferee judges are often too familiar with repeat-player attor-
neys, which obscures their ability to see that the representation may not be ade-
quate.173 What is apparent from scholars’ assessment of multidistrict litigation is that 
more voices in the room—with differing perspectives and incentives—would be of 
great benefit. Women are a necessary part of that solution. 
A second and related benefit of greater participation by women is results-oriented. 
When women are involved in decision making, the results change. In judicial deci-
sion making, studies have repeatedly shown that the judge’s gender affects the deci-
sions that he or she makes.174 One study found that in sex discrimination suits, female 
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Rosalind Dixon, Female Justices, Feminism, and the Politics of Judicial Appointment: A Re-
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judges were more likely to find in favor of the plaintiff than male judges.175 Another 
scholar reviewed fourteen studies and determined that federal female appellate 
judges had decision-making patterns distinct from their male counterparts in gender 
discrimination cases.176 The question of whether those differences are optimal is a 
matter of perspective. It is rather difficult to agree on whether some gender discrim-
ination cases are rightly decided or not.  
Setting aside the question of whether the decision making in the legal context is 
optimized when women participate in greater numbers, there is data showing that 
higher participation by women in other contexts begets better results. For example, 
in the corporate context, a recent study by the Peterson Institute for International 
Economics determined that for firms that are profitable, a 30% increase in female 
leadership within the organization was associated with a 15% increase in the net rev-
enue margin.177 Another study of Fortune 500 companies found that those with the 
highest percentage of female board of directors enjoyed a return on invested capital 
nearly 66% higher than companies with lower female participation.178 Corporate suc-
cess is measured by corporate profits, and more women as decision makers positively 
impacts that metric. One could also argue that—depending on the measure of success 
in the legal context—more women might improve the results there as well. 
The third benefit of more women participating in law is that it inures legitimacy 
to our justice system. As Larry Solum argued in his pathbreaking work Procedural 
Justice, outcomes alone are not enough to legitimize an adjudicatory system.179 No 
system is perfect, so inaccurate outcomes are inevitable. Solum argued that an im-
perfect system can still be legitimate if it is grounded in a procedural framework “that 
affords us a meaningful opportunity to participate in a process that strikes a reason-
able balance between the goal of accurate outcomes and the inevitable costs  
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imposed by any system of dispute resolution.”180 Solum’s work articulated a set of 
principles that create the foundation for procedural justice.181 The paramount prin-
ciple—according to Solum—is participation.182  
Expanding on this theory of participation is the idea that full participation in 
one’s case requires that participants believe they have been heard. Thus, the deci-
sion makers who are listening and the attorneys who are making arguments are a 
critical part of this participation value. An individual litigant who sees herself in 
the decision maker or in the attorney will have a much stronger sense of participa-
tion, and thus legitimacy. Again, identity is not the only thing that matters. Yet, the 
participation effect is more credible when the decision makers and lawyers reflect 
the population using the court system, leading to greater systemic legitimacy. 
Finally, the legal profession is generally held in high esteem and is often at the 
forefront of the pursuit of social change and justice; yet it is a profession that reg-
ularly excluded (and excludes) people viewed as “other.”183 This history of exclu-
sion in the legal profession—most would agree—is not something about which we 
as lawyers should be proud. Instead, it should compel us to take action to remediate 
the inevitable results of that exclusion. In other words, this history should not be 
hidden but should instead be discussed and utilized to counteract the consistent and 
lengthy advantage that white men had (and continue to have).184 In sum, there are 
certainly economic, systemic, and social benefits of heterogeneity, but in addition to 
those benefits, the legal profession has a duty to commit to correcting its history of 
excluding so many qualified individuals based on identity alone.  
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B. Some Steps on the Path to Gender Equity  
The gender bias task forces of the 1980s and 90s were important in their own 
right. The work identified ongoing issues with how women were treated in the court 
system, both as professionals and as parties. Relatedly, the task forces made some 
concrete recommendations for how to improve the situation for women.185 Yet, there 
were frailties. The task forces did not generally inquire into how intersectional traits 
like race impacted the experience of women.186 And, some of the recommendations, 
while progressive for the time, have proven to be inadequate to achieve gender eq-
uity.  
Whatever their net worth, one thing is for sure: The gender bias task force move-
ment shed new light on an ongoing challenge for our country, for our courts, and for 
women. It is in that spirit that this Article reflects on where women stand in the elite 
world of modern complex litigation. As the Article has detailed, there again progress 
has been made, but it has been slow, and there is much more work to be done.  
In this Part, the Article will make a variety of proposals for how to bring more 
women into positions of power within the practice of law. Some of these proposals 
will be of general applicability. For example, changing social norms around how 
women are viewed in the workplace would benefit women across all kinds of legal 
practice and indeed across all aspects of their lives. Its impact is not limited to com-
plex litigation. Other proposals harness some of what has been learned from the ex-
perience of women in complex litigation. One such proposal is the need to increase 
mentoring for women within professional networks. This kind of proposal has a spe-
cific application for women in complex litigation because the intent is to bring more 
women into equity partnership at elite law firms. Yet, it has positive ramifications 
for women who practice outside of complex litigation as well.  
The goal here is not to be comprehensive and it is certainly not to be definitive. 
Instead, the hope is that the conversation around women and the law continues, with 
thanks to the movements that have come before and with an eye toward how to im-
prove going forward. With that caveat in mind, the Article will discuss the following 
proposals: (1) confront and change base sexism and social gender norms; (2) retain 
women at major law firms through structural changes to mentoring, networking, and 
assessment; and (3) restructure systems that lead to homogeneity in legal practice; 
for example, the “slate” system for selecting plaintiffs’ attorneys in multidistrict lit-
igation.  
1. Base Sexism & Social Norms  
First, as a society, we must confront base sexism and change social norms. The 
2016 presidential election, and even more recently, the attention being paid to sexual 
harassment and assault claims by women in politics, Hollywood, and the board room 
demonstrate the foundational sexism and misogyny underlying our culture.187 When 
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doing research for this Article, for example, the query of “first woman lawyer” turned 
up a few interesting finds. High on the list was a website boasting the “10 Most 
Attractive Women Lawyers.”188 There, the achievements of amazing female lawyers 
like Amal Clooney (née Alamuddin) and Shaheed Fatima were reduced to descrip-
tions of their “breathtaking beautiful eyes,” 189 “delightful dimple[s],”190 and simi-
larly offensive top-ten lists. Overcoming this kind of latent sexism and objectification 
of women continues to be a struggle.  
Indeed, appearance is a constant challenge for women, but especially so for 
women of color. For example, African American women often struggle to make their 
hair fit an expected mold of appearance and beauty.191 The “texture and length of a 
black woman’s hair ‘becomes a proxy for legitimacy.’”192 Similarly, Muslim women 
wearing hijab experience discrimination that compounds any discrimination on the 
basis of their gender.193 The focus on women and their appearance is detrimental to 
their success in the workplace.  
The answer to this challenge is not an easy one. Awareness, education, move-
ments, and overt action by allies can only help. Failing to acknowledge that this most 
basic challenge in our culture must be overcome—as hard and intractable a problem 
as it might be—would be a mistake.  
2. Retaining & Elevating Women in Complex Litigation Practice 
Second, complex litigation draws attorneys from the most elite law firms. Those 
law firms might be hiring men and women at close to equal rates, but white women 
and women of color are not achieving commensurate rates of partnership.194 The 
question is how to both assess and ameliorate the gap between hiring and partnership 
at elite law firms.195 
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Many, if not most, elite law firms have taken public steps to demonstrate their 
commitment to diversity.196 This work has paid dividends as the number of women 
entering “BigLaw” firms has increased.197 That success is tempered, however. 
Partnership rates are still disproportionately white and male.198 Moreover, “positions 
of power [within law firms] are still predominantly stratified with an overrepresen-
tation of white men in senior positions.”199 While exceptions like Faiza Saeed—a 
practice group head at Cravath, Swaine & Moore—can be found, statistics show that 
women are rarely in top law firm positions.200 A recent study found that 25% of top 
law firms do not have any women on their management committees.201 The study 
also found that one out of every eight such law firms did not have even one female 
practice group leader.202 For women of color, the picture is similarly discouraging. 
While a recent study found that the number of African American men and women 
on management committees slightly increased, it also found that more than a third of 
top law firms do not have any men or women of color serving as the heads of practice 
groups.203 
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One major reason for the lack of women at the top is that while women are enter-
ing practice at higher rates, law firms are not retaining those women long enough to 
allow them to ascend into such positions. A recent study found that during 2015, 
18.4% of women and 20.8% of men and women of color left major law firms, com-
pared to only 13% of white men.204 These retention rates mean that while white 
women and women of color might be hired at higher rates, they are unable to succeed 
once within the firm environment. Thus, women are not gaining partnership positions 
and when the firm looks to fill leadership positions, its pool of diverse candidates is 
significantly lower. 
There are many theories for why white women and women of color are leaving 
law firms at higher rates.205 One compelling theory is that—once in the door—the 
firm is blind to difference among its associates and that such a “difference blindness” 
approach is counterproductive to creating an environment where white women and 
women of color can succeed.206 This is because the difference blindness approach is 
based on the false premise that if everyone is held to the same standards, the best will 
rise to the top and succeed.207 This premise is flawed because the merit-based stand-
ards are “built on conformity to an historical ideal worker who is white, heterosexual, 
and male.”208 So, while firms might believe that they are operating within a merit-
based system, the reality is that they are not.  
The normalization of whiteness and maleness allows implicit biases to persist and 
prevents “different” people from succeeding. If white men are the dominant group, 
their biases will have an unequal impact on who curries favor within the work-
place.209 Relatedly, human nature will prevail and people will continue to be most 
comfortable with people who are like them—a phenomenon called homophily.210 
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When the blind merits are the measuring stick, the benefits that individuals gain from 
being mentored by those who are leaders and who look like them are not considered 
and weighed.211 Stated differently, the inherent advantages that white men have when 
coming into the legal workplace are simply not accounted for when comparing their 
work with their differently-situated counterparts.  
Identifying the cause of such low retention rates is certainly a challenge, but fig-
uring out how to ameliorate the low retention rates is even more daunting. Work in 
organizational theory is useful in determining how best to structure a workplace that 
will allow for all kinds of people to succeed.212 One brief account of such work is 
instructive here. Having shed “difference blindness,” institutions should adopt a 
“bias awareness” approach.213 Adopting that approach opens the door to structural 
changes that might actually work. For example, once a firm can openly discuss bias 
and how it impacts one’s ability to succeed, it can create programs to educate indi-
viduals—especially those in leadership roles—on how bias functions.214 This educa-
tion, however, cannot be the often-ineffective required diversity training that one 
does on her computer at home, but instead must be the kind of training that forces an 
institution to collectively engage in creating equality by openly discussing bias and 
learning about how it works.215  
Once the education piece is complete, the institution must then commit to concrete 
changes such as rewarding partners who mentor diverse associates who are success-
ful.216 Conscious mentoring of white women and women of color would mean that 
those women would benefit from the implicit advantage that white men gain auto-
matically when they enter a firm. Because so much of firm leadership is still white 
and male, however, this means that any training must be targeted to teaching white 
men how to mentor and connect with individuals who do not look like them.217 
With that kind of mentoring, white women and women of color would gain valu-
able experience and—most important for ascension within a firm—be exposed to 
clients and engage in client development. This is critical for two reasons. First, the 
firm would be better able to retain white women and women of color long enough 
for them to be competitive for leadership positions. Second, once in a position to 
lead, women will be better able to compete for the highest-level positions like equity 
partner.  
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Statistics show that even when women obtain equity partnership, men still make 
44% more.218 This is largely due to origination credit—the idea that the person who 
brought in the business originally should get more money than the person who simply 
serves the client. One survey found that male partners reported an average origination 
payment of $2.6 million while female partners reported only $1.7 million.219  
This difference is due, in part, to the fact that women are not exposed to clients 
and given the opportunity to cultivate clients in a difference-blindness firm environ-
ment early in their careers. One study looked at billing records, time sheets, origina-
tion files, and personnel records across a number of law firms to determine why there 
is an “origination gap” between male and female partners.220 The study determined 
that “women tend to grow their book incrementally and often through the (obviously 
harder) process of developing clients who are brand new to the firm.”221 In contrast, 
“men tend to ‘inherit’ institutional clients – either as the sole or co-lead partner on 
major accounts.”222 This “biased origination” system traces back to the associate 
years when mentoring develops differently based largely on identity.223 
If women are to have a bigger place in complex litigation—both as lawyers and 
judges—the number of women who succeed at elite law firms must increase. To ac-
complish that goal, firms must make significant structural changes. Firms have fig-
ured out how to diversify their entry-level associate ranks;224 they must now turn 
their attention to retaining and elevating those same individuals.  
3. Restructuring Multidistrict Litigation Practices 
Within each type of practice there are additional structural barriers to women suc-
ceeding. Multidistrict litigation’s primary source of inequity is in the plaintiffs’ lead-
ership committees.225 Yet, both lawyers and judges are making changes and becom-
ing more aware of this inequality. There also appears to be a recent, concerted effort 
on the part of the current JPML to change the composition of MDL transferee judges. 
In this final proposal, the Article will use the leadership committee process and how 
lawyers and judges have responded as an example of how structural changes within 
specific areas of legal practice can begin to remedy institutionalized inequality. It 
will also discuss how the changing face of MDL transferee judges may further assist 
in this pursuit. 
                                                                                                             
 
 218. Elizabeth Olson, A 44% Pay Divide for Female and Male Law Partners, Survey Says, N.Y. 
TIMES: DEALBOOK (Oct. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/13/business/dealbook/female-
law-partners-earn-44-less-than-the-men-survey-shows.html [https://perma.cc/T4XN-27TW]. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Heidi Gardner, Harvard Study:  On Gender and Origination in the Legal Profession 
(Perspective), BLOOMBERG LAW: BIG LAW BUSINESS (Nov. 3, 2016), 
https://bol.bna.com/harvard-study-on-gender-and-origination-in-the-legal-profession [https:// 
perma.cc/8CNN-KABW]. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id.   
 223. See id. Firms using lock-step compensation systems may have more success at both 
retaining and elevating women within their partnership ranks.  
 224. See supra note 196. 
 225. See supra Part II.C. 
2018] A LEGAL FEMPIRE?  649 
 
Traditionally, MDL transferee judges solicited and received a “slate” of proposed 
attorneys to serve on leadership committees.226 While slates have the benefit of en-
suring expertise, experience, and a collegial working group, they have a downside.227 
As discussed earlier, the homogeneity of such a group presents risks such as confir-
mation bias.228 Moreover, the slate process necessarily excludes new entrants into 
the MDL process because repeat players tend to dominate the slates presented to 
judges.229 We know the composition of those repeat players are white men, so the 
slate process necessarily institutionalizes a gender and race disparity.  
In response, some judges have adopted “an individualized-appointment process 
[that] allows the decisive factors in selecting between the many qualified attorneys 
to become skill, diversity of clients, diversity of experience, and other factors that 
would more directly improve the results in the MDL.”230 This new trend is generally 
being well-received by experienced complex litigation attorneys. For example, 
Elizabeth Cabraser, most recently the solo lead counsel in the Volkswagen “Clean 
Diesel” litigation, explained that the individual-appointments process “promotes di-
versity naturally, without discounting merit, because it simply eliminates the barriers 
to entry that a slate system can subconsciously impose.”231 Changing the way the 
selection process works has already resulted in changes to plaintiffs’ leadership com-
mittees, lending credibility to the argument that changes to certain structures can 
actually decrease barriers for women. 
An additional way that women in multidistrict litigation have begun to increase 
their participation in leadership positions is to demand it. Most notably, Jayne 
Conroy, an attorney at Simmons Hanly Conroy, argued that Judge James Selna 
should consider the demographic composition of the plaintiffs in the Toyota acceler-
ator litigation (as over half the Toyota buyers were women).232 Because so many 
plaintiffs were women, Conroy argued, the judge should ensure that the leadership 
committee was reflective of the plaintiffs it was representing.233 This was a blatant 
declaration that the legitimacy of the process, to some degree, depended on the com-
position of the leadership committee. The argument was not that the judge should 
appoint women solely for the sake of aesthetics, but that among a large pool of 
equally qualified candidates—both men and women—an effort should be made to 
reflect the composition of the plaintiffs because there was a real value to that diver-
sity.234 Conroy was appointed to a leadership role, and many saw this as something 
of a tipping point for engaging judges in the demographic composition of leadership 
committees.235 It is not clear yet whether similar arguments might work for the in-
clusion of women of color.  
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Some judges have been explicit about ensuring that attorneys be more representa-
tive of their clients in aggregate litigation. Judge Harold Baer Jr. (deceased) regularly 
and quite controversially required that lawyers in class action cases in his court be 
“diverse.”236 In certifying a class in an Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA) and age discrimination case, Judge Baer provided the following:  
The proposed class includes thousands of Plan participants, both male 
and female, arguably from diverse racial and ethnic backgrounds. There-
fore, I believe it is important to all concerned that there is evidence of 
diversity, in terms of race and gender, of any class counsel I appoint. A 
review of the firm biographies provides some information on this score. 
Here, it appears that gender and racial diversity exists, to a limited extent, 
with respect to the principal attorneys involved in the case. Co-lead coun-
sel has met this Court's diversity requirement—i.e., that at least one mi-
nority lawyer and one woman lawyer with requisite experience at the 
firm be assigned to this matter.237 
Judge Baer’s approach was not met with universal acceptance. In a rare opinion 
written to deny a writ of certiorari, Justice Alito took aim at Judge Baer’s approach, 
which he noted had “impose[d] race- and sex-based staffing requirements on law 
firms” who represented classes before Judge Baer.238 While the issue was not 
squarely before the Court, Justice Alito took the time to opine that “[c]ourt-approved 
discrimination based on gender is . . . objectionable, and therefore it is doubtful that 
the practice in question could survive a constitutional challenge.”239 
Judge Baer’s attention to the composition of the lawyers before him was never 
tested in a court case. Yet, other judges appear to be following in his footsteps, 
although perhaps not quite so blatantly. Recently, in her MDL order, Judge Cynthia 
M. Rufe advised the leadership committee she appointed to provide participation op-
portunities for the non-appointed attorneys who remained.240 Perhaps an awareness 
of the repeat-player problem and its impact on the composition of leadership com-
mittees can be ameliorated by judges putting similar pressure on attorneys to mentor 
and provide opportunities for new entrants.241  
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Relatedly, women within multidistrict litigation have begun to organize and net-
work in an effort to increase their numbers. According to Elizabeth Cabraser, 
“Women lawyers and attorneys of color are organizing, networking, and promoting 
and supporting each other.”242 Groups like Women En Mass, a “self-organized group 
of women plaintiffs’ tort lawyers,” have already helped to augment the visibility of 
women as judges and in litigation leadership positions.243 As the law firm setting 
demonstrates, mentorship is a key component of breaking down barriers for white 
women and women of color. This kind of networking may be an additional way to 
provide that necessary tool for success.  
Finally, the current JPML appears to be making a concerted effort to expand the 
gender and racial composition of the pool of MDL transferee judges. For example, 
of eight recently appointed MDL transferee judges, there is a noticeable level of gen-
der and racial diversity. While three of the judges are white men, the remaining five 
are one African American man, one South Asian American man, one African Amer-
ican woman, one Asian American woman, and one white woman.244 The JPML 
seems cognizant of the fact that it must ensure that new judges get the opportunity to 
develop expertise in managing MDL cases. For example, in a recent transfer order to 
one of these judges—Judge Indira Talwani—the JPML stated that Judge Talwani 
“ha[d] not yet had an opportunity to preside over an MDL docket,” yet the Panel was 
persuaded that Judge Talwani could rightfully handle the case.245 By giving new-to-
MDL judges a chance, there is a positive impact on gender and racial diversity. These 
“rookie” judges are more reflective of the general population and will undoubtedly 
have some amount of impact on leadership attorney selection. The degree of that 
impact remains to be seen.  
CONCLUSION 
There is much to overcome. Yet, the sheer breadth of what needs to change should 
not distract from the fact that the effort, if fruitful, is more than worth it. In 2003, 
Judith Resnik observed that the work of confronting gender bias was not a project 
that was just beginning.246 Instead, Resnik stated, “as George Eliot put in when open-
ing her novel, Daniel Deronda, we are in the medias res—in the middle.”247 In 2017, 
it appears that we are still deeply in media res: we are not just beginning and progress 
has indeed been made, but our work is certainly not done.  
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